Unlock the free White House Watch newsletter
Your guide to what Trump’s second term means for Washington, business and the world
“The Monroe Doctrine is a great thing, but we’ve replaced a lot of it, de facto. They call it the ‘Donro Doctrine’ now.” Donald Trump said this hours after the US military ousted Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela.
The Venezuela operation is a dramatic demonstration of the Trump administration’s determination to establish US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The idea was at the heart of the US national security strategy published last month. The US President’s obvious delight at the initial success of the Venezuela operation suggests that he may have developed a taste for intervention in America’s broadly defined “backyard.”
But the implications of regime change in Venezuela are truly global. The proclamation of the Donero Doctrine – coupled with Trump’s steps toward rapprochement with Russia and China – suggests that he is attracted to a world order organized around great power spheres of influence.
Both Russia and China condemned Maduro’s ouster. But Xi Jinping would happily give up Chinese influence in Venezuela if it meant Beijing was given a free hand over Taiwan. Russia will make the same agreement on Ukraine. Fiona Hill, who previously served in the Trump administration, told Congress in 2019 that the Russian government was “signaling very strongly that they somehow wanted to make some very strange swap deal between Venezuela and Ukraine”.
However, for now the focus will be on whether and how the US can “run” Venezuela – as Trump has promised. In the interest of establishing stability – and gaining quick access to the country’s vast oil reserves – the Trump administration is clearly signaling that it intends to make a deal with the remnants of the Maduro regime, rather than supporting the democratic opposition in exile.
The success or failure of that strategy may determine how ambitious the US will be in expanding its influence in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. A potential target list is already emerging. In comments made after Maduro’s capture, Trump issued a veiled warning to Colombia and Mexico. He said that Colombia’s President, Gustavo Petro, “is making cocaine… so he has to watch his ass.” He praised Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, but said that drug cartels are “running Mexico”. There has been a long-running debate in Trumpist circles over whether the United States should use force against Mexican cartels inside Mexico. Till now caution remains. But the thrill of toppling Maduro could change Trump’s calculations.
The communist regime in Cuba – which was the subject of several failed US attempts at regime change in the 1960s – is also back in Washington’s crosshairs. Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, whose parents fled Cuba for the US, has already put Havana on notice, saying the Cuban government is a “big problem” and also ominously adding – “I think they’re in a lot of trouble… I’m not going to talk to you about what our future steps will be.” Maduro’s fall would certainly cause problems for Cubans, who have become dependent on Venezuelan oil and subsidies.
And then there is Greenland. Trump has reasserted his desire to annex the island – which is an autonomous part of Denmark. Shortly after the Venezuela operation, Katie Miller, the wife of Trump’s deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller, posted a map of Greenland covered by the Stars and Stripes — and the word “SOON” written over it.
Seizing portions of a NATO ally’s territory would be a more radical step than overthrowing an authoritarian Latin American leader. But the Trump administration has been preparing the rhetoric to take action on Greenland for some time now – blaming the Danes fail There. Given the administration’s open contempt for its European allies, a US effort at annexation cannot be ruled out.
All this will be watched with fascination in Beijing and Moscow. A world in which powerful states and powerful rulers can do more or less what they want in their immediate neighborhood would suit Russia and China very well. Trump himself may believe that dividing the world into informal spheres of influence could be a path to “strategic stability” with the Russia and China that the recent US National Security Strategy has placed as a priority.
The idea that great powers’ spheres of influence create stability may seem plausible on the surface. But it ignores the views and interests of smaller countries that are considered too unimportant to decide their own destiny. And those countries have agency – and they can sometimes fight, as Ukraine has demonstrated.
Even when only the interests of the so-called “major powers” are taken into account, spheres of influence are still likely to create stability as well as friction. This is because the global interests of a country like America will remain. For example, China considers Taiwan part of its territory and a “core” national interest. But the US believes its own national security would be at risk if Taiwan’s semiconductor industry fell into Chinese hands – or if Beijing controlled shipping passing through the South China Sea.
Swapping American dominance in the Western Hemisphere for Chinese dominance in East Asia would be the deal of the century. For China.
gideon.rachman@ft.com
