It was a secret military shipment docking at a Yemeni port that ultimately exposed the dramatically escalating tensions between Gulf giants Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Riyadh has been unsuccessfully using diplomatic channels for weeks to pressure the UAE-backed Yemeni faction to withdraw from provinces it captured next to the Saudi border in December. Now, Saudi Arabia alleged, the UAE was sending weapons and armored vehicles to the separatist Southern Transitional Council group.
Riyadh became angry. It bombed the shipment, publicly accused the UAE of supporting the Yemeni faction’s attack and called on Abu Dhabi to withdraw its remaining troops from the war-torn state. The UAE rejected the Saudi allegations but said it would withdraw its forces as it sought to de-escalate the crisis.
The extraordinary surge has thrown the Saudi-backed Yemeni government into chaos. But its impact could be felt far more broadly, pitting key U.S. allies, major trading partners and the Arab world’s two most influential leaders against each other: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, and United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, or MBZ.
“It’s worrisome because it compromises efforts to address every point of tension in the region – Yemen, Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan,” said Dan Shapiro, a former US diplomat now at the Atlantic Council. “If Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not on the same page and see their interests in conflict, it will be difficult for each of them to resolve this.”
A decade ago, the two Gulf countries’ long alliance seemed destined for an energetic new chapter between ambitious leaders.
MBZ, who at 64 is more than two decades older than MBS, was an early supporter of his Saudi counterpart’s campaign to modernize and promote a more moderate version of Islam in the deeply conservative kingdom.
The UAE had long benefited from serving as a base for foreign companies doing business in Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil exporter and the Gulf’s largest economy. But Abu Dhabi was wary of the social and political risks of the conservative nation’s stagnation on its doorstep. Reform efforts were welcomed.
As their relationship developed, MBZ promoted MBS and his plans in Washington. Some analysts suggested that older, more experienced Emiratis acted as protectors to the millennium prince – a characterization rejected in Riyadh.
In the region, they joined forces to seize power: the UAE was Riyadh’s main partner when MBS led the coalition to intervene against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen’s civil war in 2015. He also led the regional sanctions imposed on Qatar in 2017 – which sparked the last Gulf crisis.
But as MBS became more confident and consolidated his power, he tried to propel his nation to its rightful role on the global stage — and friction between the two assertive, absolute monarchies resurfaced.
“Each saw itself as the natural leader: Saudi believes its size and symbolic power should prevail, while the UAE believes its leading power is more in line with global dynamics,” said Emile Hokayem at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Under MBZ, the UAE used its financial clout and relationships with the West to become arguably the most influential Arab state, despite its small size. After the 2011 popular uprisings threatened the status quo in the Middle East, the UAE became the most vocal regional actor as it sought to push back against Islamist movements and shape the region in its vision.
Saudi Arabia and the smaller, nimble UAE “have very different risk profiles domestically and globally, and different ideas about how the region should be structured,” Hochem said.
Tensions in Yemen first came to light in 2019 when the UAE changed policy and announced it would withdraw its troops, which were the Saudi-led coalition’s main foreign force on the ground. The same year, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government accused the United Arab Emirates of bombing its forces because the Gulf country supported rival Houthi opposition factions.
Economic rivalry also intensified, reaching a peak in 2021 when MBS launched a campaign to force multinationals to move their regional headquarters from the UAE to Riyadh. Corporates were given three years to take the step or risk losing lucrative government contracts. Emiratis saw the move as a direct challenge to Dubai’s role as the region’s leading finance centre.
Differences have also grown over Syria, the Sudanese civil war, and crude oil production quotas set by OPEC+ – the oil cartel whose de facto leader is Saudi Arabia.
As tensions waxed and waned, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser and MBZ’s brother, would be sent to Riyadh to resolve their differences.
Sheikh Tahnoun, considered less ideological than MBZ, has good relations with the Saudis. But as distance grew between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and power dynamics changed, their job became more difficult, a former US official said.
“Tahnoun regularly traveled to Saudi Arabia to look after the grass, and what was worse, he stayed there for long periods of time,” the former official said. “Now that MBS is king in all but name, this has affected Tahnoun’s ability to repair their relationship.”
Analysts say the Gulf countries still have much in common and both sides speak of their “fraternal” neighbours. But in recent months, the war in Sudan has hit them hard.
Both had supported the Sudanese military leadership that took power after the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in 2019. But when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group turned their guns on each other, differences emerged between the Gulf countries.
Riyadh is close to the SAF, which it sees as representing the state, but the UAE feels it is infiltrated by Islamists. Abu Dhabi is accused of providing weapons to the RSF, which has been accused of genocide. The UAE has denied providing weapons to the militia.
MBS expressed his concerns about the Sudan conflict and the RSF with Donald Trump during a visit to the White House in November.
Soon after the Trump-MBS meeting, the latest Yemen crisis broke out. In December, the UAE-backed STC faction – which is apparently part of the Yemeni government – took control of two provinces along the Saudi borders, Hadramaut and al-Mahra.
Riyadh believes Abu Dhabi wrongly thought MBS took issue with the US president sanctioning the UAE over alleged support for the RSF – and then green-lighted STC progress out of anger with the kingdom.
Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, an Emirati academic, said linking events in Yemen to differences over Sudan is “unusual analysis”.
The conflict in Yemen was stalled after Riyadh agreed to a ceasefire with the Houthis in 2022 and tried to extricate itself from the war, with MBS focusing on his domestic agenda.
But the separatist attack dealt a serious blow to Saudi Arabia’s influence as well as the Yemeni government it supports. And, in Riyadh’s view, this attacks its national security.
“Yemen is Saudi Arabia’s backyard,” said Firas Maqsad, managing director of the Middle East and North Africa at Eurasia Group. “The offensive launched by UAE-backed forces… crossed the Saudi border.”
Maksad said Abu Dhabi’s decision to withdraw its remaining forces provided a way to “avoid a head-on confrontation with significant consequences.”
However, Maksad said, the risk is that the crisis “could turn the Saudi-UAE geopolitical competition into a personal confrontation between the region’s major powerhouses”.
